1939 – 1940

1940

     On 3^rd January a number of young soldiers were posted out of the Regiment.  They were referred to as ‘Immatures’ (under 18½ yrs old) and were sent to Anti-Aircraft (AA) and Searchlight (SL) regiments around the country.  [The term ‘immatures’ was used by Winston Churchill to refer to the underage soldiers who joined the Territorial Army before the war started.  These soldiers were too young to be sent overseas to fight, so they were deployed in various roles within Britain].  This decision however meant that a lot of these young soldiers probably saw action during the ‘Battle of Britain’ (July 1940-May 1941) before the men of the 63^rd AT Regt !  [This event was remembered very well by one of the Immatures and wrote several episodes of his experiences for the QOOH Assoc newsletters.  His recollection is of 10 young men from 249 Bty, who left the Regt whilst it was at Walton Hall, near Wellesbourne, Warwickshire.  Some 10 hours later, after travelling by train via London, arrived at Swaffham, Norfolk at the HQ of 409 Bty, 78 HAA Regt.  Their task was to guard/protect four widely scattered RAF bomber airfields in the vicinity.]
     A new CO, Lt-Col MacDonald, had been posted to the Regt on 20^th April 1940.  [Sir John Thomson, in his memoirs in the Yeomanry Memories book, had the following to say about Lt-Col MacDonald – “As recorded, was ‘prickly’, eccentric and unpopular with all ranks.  None of us could get on with him.  The ‘Authorities’ – thought it was our fault – so sent us an efficient Regular, Capt Rowland Symonds, to serve as his adjutant and to report to them.  As a result of his assessment, MacDonald was posted away in September 1940”].
     On 1st May, with the Regt now at Friz Hill, Wellesbourne, Warwickshire – 2/Lt MR Sperling was attached to RHQ, from 249 Bty, to act as Regtl MT Officer.  Regimental and Battery Training carried on.
     On 3^rd May, the Regiment was inspected by the GOC-in-C, Home Forces, Gen Sir Walter Kirke, GCB, CMG, DSO, at Walton Hall.  He was attended by his Military Secretary and ADC, and the CRA 61^st Div, and the Bde Maj RA accompanied him.  251 and 252 Batteries marched over from Butlers Marston and Kineton.
     In early May, the Regt fired their rifle course at Wedgnock Range, Warwick.  On 11^th May, 2/Lt PT Aston returned from the Army Gas School, Tregantle Wing [Tregantle Fort is in south east Cornwall and one of several forts surrounding Plymouth].  On 23^rd May, Lt(QM) JH Fidoe was posted to Depot RA, Woolwich.  On 26^th May, Capt RC Symonds was posted to Regt from 61^st Divisional School to take up the position of Adjutant, with 2/Lt THF Whitton appointed Assistant Adjutant.  2/Lt FW Deakin relinquishes appt of Adjutant and is posted back to 249 Bty.  2/Lt Viscount Harcourt relinquishes appt of Asst Adjutant and is posted back to 252 Bty.  A further two officers had been posted into the Regt during this month.
     On 31st May, the Regtl HQ’s received from 61^st Div RA, warning of the imminence of an enemy attack, immediate action was taken by all Batteries who made preparations for an instant move.
     On 1^st June, the 63^rd AT Regt RA received orders to move to Newbury-Kingsclere district on 6 June 40.
     On 4^th June, the Advance Party moved into Benham Park, Newbury, to prepare for arrival of Regt.  251 Bty received orders to take over Guard duties at Brize Norton and Rissington aerodromes.  On 12^th June, the last of the Rear Party arrived at Benham having handed over buildings at Walton, Friz Hill, Woodley & Butlers Marston.
     On 16^th June, Orders were received, to move the Regt to Portsmouth to take over the commitments of 184 Inf Bde.  251 Bty to move from Brize Norton to Portsmouth.  After many conferences and discussions at Fareham Fort the VP [Vulnerable Points] commitments of the Regt were settled.  On 17^th June, the Regt moved to Portsmouth Area and took over the VP’s, coming under command of 5 Corps [and it is thought this was in the event of a German invasion].  These  VP’s were scattered between Southampton (Taunton Schools PoW Camp) in the West, and Thorney Island (RAF Station) in the East.  251 Bty also supplied a guard for Buriton Tunnel near Petersfield.  RHQ was established at Havant.
     On 25^th June, Orders received to hand over VP’s to 119 Fd Regt and to move back to Oxford.  On 28^th June, the VP’s were handed over.  The Regt moved to Roche Court, Fareham, for the night.  On 29^th June, the Regt moved to Port Meadow, Oxford.  While at Portsmouth, the Regt was under command of V Corps,  they were now back in 61^st Div.
     On 1^st July, it is understood that one Bty (249) will be fully equipped immediately.  On 2^nd July, an Urgent Postal Telegram arrived, received from the War Office.  The Regt is to move overseas on or about 4^th July 40.  One Battery to be mobilized forthwith; the remainder at a later date whilst overseas.  On 3^rd July, vehicles began arriving from Chilwell [RAOC Depot near Nottingham].  Other equipment being collected by the QM.
     On 4^th July, Orders received by phone by 61^st Div, for the move.  On 5^th July, a Road Party, consisting of 37 veh’s and 36 M/C’s, left Port Meadow for Glasgow, stopping one night at Catterick and one at Dumfries, departure 05.00.  The bulk of the Regt left Port Meadow and entrained at LMS Railway Station, Oxford during the night 8/9^th July.  It was not until they had reached Stranraer that their destination was made known to them – N Ireland.  [The reason for this move was to counter any move by the Germans into (a neutral) Southern Ireland and therefore through the ‘back-door’ to Britain].
     10^th July, and the Regt is now at Lisburn, N Ireland, and found them settling into billets as follows: 249 Bty – the Grain Market, a good billet with ample vehicle park for the new veh’s allotted just before the move from Oxford;  251 Bty – the Co-operative Stores;  250 and 252 Bty’s – at Richardson’s Factory.  The Regt was informed that it was definitely in 53^rd(W) Division.
     On 31^st July the War Diary states the following ;-
     At the close of the month, it may be well to include a summary of the position with regard to equipment and to the commitments of the Regt :-
          Equipment           RHQ   249    250    251    252             Totals
          2pdr guns                           8         6                                        14
          A/Tank rifles                       4         4         1        1                   10
          Bren guns                1       12       10       11      11                  45
          Rifles                         6       59       59       75      75                  274
          Telescopic sights               3          1                                        4
          Ammunition
          2pdr  rds                           934      672                                     1606
          .303                                                                                            97000
          MT
          Cars                           4        2         2                                         8
          8 cwt                                    3         2                                         5
          15 cwt                        3      12        9            1                           25
          30 cwt                        3        5        5                                         13
          3 tons                                                                     1                  1
     Commitments:  As regards operations, the unit acts on the code words (i) ‘CROMWELL’, (ii) ‘HARE’.
          (i) on code word ‘CROMWELL’, all British Troops in Ireland will be ready to move at 6 hrs notice.  Until                      movement is ordered, all units will man their alarm posts and hold mobile columns ready to move.  This                Unit’s mobility is limited to RHQ, 249 & 250 Batteries.  251 & 252 Bty’s have no vehicles and could only                    move if these were provided.
          (ii) The code word, ‘HARE’, only affects the 2 Batteries, 249 & 250.
          249 Bty will receive a ‘Zero hour’ and will move at Z+7½ hrs to their concentration area. (Tanderagee-                      Markethill-Keady).  They come under command of 53^rd Div on ‘HARE’.
          250 Battery will probably move within 4 hrs of receipt of the code word to Londonderry and will come                    under command of 182 Inf Bde of 61^st Div.
          The remainder of the Regt will remain in their Defence Area, presumably under the command of 158 Bde,              under BTNI [British Troops, N Ireland].
          For ‘Intelligence Security and Defence’ the Regt is under command of 158 (Royal Welch) Bde and has been              allotted an area extending from Crumlin and Ballyhill in the North to Lough Neagh in the West, Lisburn                  and Aghalee in the South.
     On 12^th Aug, four 75mm guns had arrived, and this means a further re-organisation of the batteries.
     On 31^st Aug, the present ‘War Establishment’ of the Regt consists of: six 2pdr guns and three 75mm guns per battery.  Of these we have at present six 2pdrs per bty plus the four 75mm guns, and have allotted two to 251 Bty and two to 252 Bty.
     On 3^rd September, a Telegram was received posting Lt-Col MacDonald to 88 Fd Regt RA.  Lt-Col Arthur Charles Brooke was posted in, to command the Regt from this date.
          The following comments had been recorded in the War Diary on 30^th Sep :-
               During this month, training has proceeded and there have been a number of exercises.  Every battery                     has now been out on an exercise.  The Regt is now equipped with 24 x 2pdr guns and 12 x 75mm’s.  We                 are expecting to receive the remaining 24 guns in the near future and to pass on the 12 x 75mm’s which                 we now have.
     On 21^st Oct, Capt S Hurry, RAOC was posted from “attached to this unit as I/C LAD” to DOS [Director of Ordnance Services] “E” Directorate (War office). [at this time the REME had not been formed and all the tasks and duties (which will come under the REME on formation) were carried out by the RAOC]
     Over 21^st to 24^th Nov, a Practice Firing Camp was held at Dungiven in the Sperrin Mountains.  The shoot proved the excellence of the 2-pdr.
     On 25^th Nov, Capt RC Symonds, was posted from this unit to 133 Fd Regt RA.  [He had been Adj of the Regt, tasked with ‘watching’ Lt-Col MacDonald]
     On 28^th Nov, 42 O/R’s were posted and joined this unit from ITC [Infantry Training Centre], Royal Scots Fusiliers, Ayr.  Between August and December, 5 new officers had been posted into the Regiment.  The Regiment had taken part in several Divisional and Brigade exercises through 1940.
     [Earlier in the year, Capt Ben Barnett had been posted out of the Regt to take up a ‘Staff Officer’ post at Vitre, east of Rennes, in Britanny, France.  Whilst the Evacuation of Dunkirk (May 7^th – June 4^th) was ongoing, Barnett and a few other Staff Officers manage to get to St Malo and scrounge a lift on a hospital ship which was about to leave, eventually arriving at Plymouth.  On his return to Britain, Barnett reported to the War Office and was given a further Staff Officer post with a Scottish AT regiment [54^th AT Regt] stationed in Perthshire.  Eventually, in January 1941, he was posted back to the 63^rd AT Regt, who by this time were in N Ireland.]
     During 1940 the Regt had a visit and inspection from the following high-ranking officer – GOC-in-C, Home Forces, Gen Sir Walter Kirke, GCB, CMG, DSO, in May.

     So how and why did the Oxfordshire Yeomanry end up in N Ireland in July 1940 ?
     ‘Plan W’, during World War II, was a plan of joint military operations between the governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom devised between 1940 and 1942, to be executed in the event of an invasion of Ireland by Nazi Germany.
     Although Ireland was officially neutral, after the German Blitzkriegs of 1939–40 that resulted in the defeat of Poland, the Low Countries and France, the British recognised that Germany planned an invasion of Britain (Operation Sea Lion) and were also concerned about the possibility of a German invasion of Ireland (Operation Green).  German planning for Operation Green began in May 1940 and the British began intercepting communications about it in June.  The British were interested in securing Ireland, as its capture by German forces would expose their western flank and provide a base of operations for the Luftwaffe in the Battle of the Atlantic and in any operations launched to invade Great Britain as part of Operation Sea Lion.
     However, because of the threat of German occupation and seizure of Ireland and especially the valuable Irish ports, ‘Plan W’ was developed.  Northern Ireland was to serve as the base of a new British Expeditionary Force that would move across the Irish border to repel the invaders from any beach-head established by German paratroopers.  In addition, coordinated actions of the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy were planned to repel German air and sea invasion.  According to a restricted file prepared by the British Army’s “Q” Movements Transport Control in Belfast, the British would not have crossed the border “until invited to do so by the Irish Government”.
     By April 1941 the new British Troops in Northern Ireland (BTNI) commander, General Sir Henry Pownall, extended his planning for a German invasion to cover fifty percent of the entire Irish coastline.  He believed that German troops were likely to land in Cork, Limerick, Waterford, Westport, Galway, Sligo, and County Donegal, i.e. on the southern or western coasts.
     Despite its detailed nature, Operation Green is thought to have been designed only as a credible threat, a feint, not an actual operation.  ‘Plan W’, a planned occupation of all of the Free State by the British Armed Forces, was drafted by the British military in secret liaison with the Irish government to counteract any German invasion.  This had raised suspicion that intercepted ‘chatter’ about Operation Green may have been aimed at creating a ‘bogeyman’ in the minds of British military planners on their western flank.
     The German attack on N Ireland obviously never happened, but in the ‘fog of war’ who really knows what is rumour or what is fact.  If it had been ignored, and Germany succeeded in capturing Britain, who knows what the outcome of WWII might have been.  As a direct result of this decision to send troops to N Ireland many thousands of men (British and Americans) found themselves residing in the Emerald isles for a few years.